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By  SUSANNE LOHMANN* 
Information  about various  policy alternatives  is dispersed  among  the individualr 
members  of a society.  Prior to a vote over the alternatives,  some people take 
costly  political  action to signal  their  private  information  to voters.  By informing 
voting decisions,  political action has potential to decrease  the likelihood  that 
voters  cast "mistaken"  votes.  Perhaps  surprisingly,  pre-election  communication 
may be counterproductive.  The  dispersed  information  is partially  aggregated  by 
the vote, and political action may contribute  "noise"  to the voting  process.  In 
some cases, the voting  mechanism  is more  likely  to implement  the  full-informa- 
tion voting  outcome  in the absence  of pre-election  political  action. (JEL D72, 
D82, H41) 
Information  pertinent to individual  deci- 
sions "never exists in concentrated  or inte- 
grated  form, but solely as the dispersed  bits 
of incomplete and frequently  contradictory 
knowledge  which all the separate individu- 
als possess" (F.  A.  Hayek, 1945 p.  519). 
Every society faces the economic problem 
of utilizing  information  that is not known  to 
anyone  in its totality.  Dispersed  information 
can be aggregated  in a number  of ways.  For 
example, prices formed in market trading 
have the potential to  transmit private in- 
formation held  by  market  participants. 
Perhaps  less obviously,  the price system  co- 
exists with political mechanisms, some of 
which also aggregate  information. 
In democratic societies, voters regularly 
choose  between competing political pro- 
grams  by majority  rule. Their private  infor- 
mation about the consequences of various 
policies  affects  their  votes. The majority-rule 
voting mechanism thus  allows for  some 
aggregation of  information (Marie  Jean 
Antoine Nicolas Caritat  Condorcet,  1785). 
Prior  to a vote, people often take political 
action. By signing petitions, taking part in 
demonstrations,  or participating  in violent 
riots, they may signal their dissatisfaction 
with the status  quo. To the extent that these 
protest activities  are informative  about pol- 
icy  consequences, they  may affect other 
individuals'  voting decisions.  Thus, informa- 
tion may also be aggregated  through  politi- 
cal action. 
In many  cases, the analysis  of the proper- 
ties of the price mechanism  has been based 
on  the  simplifying assumption that  the 
transaction  costs of information  aggregation 
are zero. In contrast, the private costs of 
taking political action are central to  the 
analysis  of  mass  participation. Mancur 
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Olson (1965) argues  that political  participa- 
tion  is  plagued by a  free-rider problem. 
According to  Olson, the  probability that 
one individual's  action will be decisive for 
political outcomes is negligible in a large 
society. He  concludes that  rational, self- 
interested  individuals  do not have incentives 
to engage in costly political action. Based 
on Olson's analysis,  ongoing and extensive 
mass participation  is thought of as an im- 
practical means by which individuals can 
express  their policy preferences. 
This paper analyzes  political action as a 
signaling  phenomenon. I establish that ra- 
tional, self-interested individuals may en- 
gage in costly political action despite the 
presence of a free-rider  problem.  Their ac- 
tions are informative  for voters who ratio- 
nally  take a cue from the size of the protest 
movement against the  status  quo.  The 
political-action  mechanism  aggregates  some 
of the individuals'  private  information  prior 
to the vote at a cost privately  incurred  by 
activists.  This mechanism  coexists with the 
voting mechanism  that costlessly  aggregates 
some of the dispersed information  via the 
vote. 
By informing voting decisions, political 
action has the potential  to increase  the like- 
lihood that the full-information  voting out- 
come  is  achieved.  Perhaps  surprisingly, 
however, pre-election communication  may 
be counterproductive.  Given that some in- 
formation is  aggregated by the  vote, the 
marginal  qontribution  of the political-action 
mechanism  may consist in adding noise. In 
some cases, the full-information  voting out- 
come  is  ex ante  more  likely  to  be  imple- 
mented by the  voting mechanism in  the 
absence  of pre-election  political  action. 
The remainder  of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section I discusses  why the free- 
rider problem  identified  by Olson (1965) is 
partially overcome in  a  setting that links 
signaling and participation  games. Section 
II develops a signaling model of  political 
action. Section III characterizes  a political- 
action and voting equilibrium.  Section IV 
examines  the link between pre-election  po- 
litical action and the  likelihood that the 
full-information  voting outcome is  imple- 
mented. Section V contains  the conclusion. 
I.  Signaling and Participation 
The  analysis is based on  the  following 
setting. In a majority-rule  referendum  vot- 
ers choose between  two distinct  policies:  the 
status quo and a policy alternative.'  Voters 
have  preferences over  policy  outcomes, 
which depend on the policy chosen in the 
referendum  and on the state of the world. 
Consequently,  the individuals'  policy  prefer- 
ences are a  function of  the  state of  the 
world. 
Voters have traditionally  been thought  of 
as  rationally ignorant (Anthony Downs, 
1957).  While this assumption  is plausible  for 
expert knowledge  that is costly to obtain, it 
is less appealing  for types of knowledge  that 
are costless by-products  of practical  experi- 
ence. In their daily lives, people obtain in- 
formation about the consequences of vari- 
ous policies for their wealth or well-being. 
One individual's  experience  leads to a fairly 
imprecise estimate of  the  benefits to  be 
derived from various  policies in the future, 
whereas the collective  experiences  of all in- 
dividuals  reflect these benefits quite accu- 
rately. 
If no information  is publicly  revealed  prior 
to the vote, people's voting decisions are a 
function of their private information  only. 
The voting  mechanism  then allows  for some 
aggregation  of information.  In many states 
of the world, a majority  of the imperfectly 
informed  voters choose the alternative  that 
would also be  implemented if  the voters 
were fully  informed.  However,  in some states 
of the world, a majority  of voters may vote 
in favor of one policy although  they would 
be better off under the alternative  policy. 
If the information  dispersed  in the popu- 
lation were partially  or fully revealed prior 
to the vote, people might be less likely to 
cast mistaken  votes. In this situation,  some 
'The analysis  also applies  to a majority-rule  election 
over two candidates  who have fixed  and distinct  policy 
positions. Moreover,  this article analyzes  the case in 
which political action is directed at voters and influ- 
ences voting  decisions;  Lohmann  (1993a)  examines  the 
related  case in which  political  action  informs  the policy 
decision  made by a policymaker. 520  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE 1994 
individuals may have incentives to  signal 
their private information  to the electorate 
and influence  the voting outcome.  They can 
transmit  their information  by being counted 
as part of a protest movement against the 
status quo. 
The electorate understands  the individu- 
als' incentives  to engage in political action 
as a function of their private information. 
Using a  simple statistic, the  publicly ob- 
served number of  political actions, voters 
update their beliefs  on  the  state of  the 
world and consequently  on the relative  ben- 
efits to be derived  from the status quo and 
the policy alternative.  Since their updated 
beliefs affect  their  votes, the probability  that 
the status quo is overturned  is a function  of 
the  observed number of  political actions. 
This functional  relationship,  in turn, deter- 
mines the individuals'  incentives  to take po- 
litical action. 
Olson's (1965) analysis suggests that the 
nonnegligible  private costs of political par- 
ticipation create disincentives  for rational, 
self-interested individuals  to participate if 
they are part of a large society.  However,  in 
a  seminal paper  on  the  game-theoretic 
foundations  of voting, John Ledyard  (1984) 
shows  that zero voting  turnout  cannot be an 
equilibrium  for some set of strictly  positive 
costs of voting  if the alternatives  are distinct 
and the  population is  of  finite size.  Ex- 
pected voter turnout is strictly  positive for 
some nonempty  set of strictly  positive  voting 
costs. Subsequent  work by Thomas Palfrey 
and Howard  Rosenthal  (1985) suggests  that 
expected voter turnout is close to zero if 
the electorate is large and imperfectly  in- 
formed. Faced by the  empirical fact that 
electoral  turnout  is typically  huge, they con- 
clude that "we have come full circle and are 
once  again beset by the  'paradox of  not 
voting"' (p. 64). 
This paper examines  the case in which a 
costless vote is preceded by costly political 
action.' As suggested  by Ledyard's  analysis, 
the probability  that one individual's  political 
action will be decisive for the outcome is 
strictly  positive  in a finite-sized  society,  even 
if the society is very large. Thus, expected 
political-action turnout is  strictly positive 
for  some strictly positive costs of  taking 
political action. 
Moreover,  this paper synthesizes  partici- 
pation and signaling  games  by casting  politi- 
cal action as a signaling  phenomenon.  Polit- 
ical action  informs  voters'  decisions  and thus 
affects policy outcomes. In this setting, a 
small number  of political actions may have 
a decisive  effect for two reasons.  First, peo- 
ple's policy preferences  are correlated.  One 
individual's  experience, if made public, af- 
fects other individuals'  policy preferences. 
As a consequence, the information  that is 
revealed  through  the political  actions  of very 
few people  has the  potential to  affect a 
large number of voting decisions. Second, 
when extracting  information  from the ob- 
served number of  political actions, voters 
take into account  the individuals'  incentives 
to engage in political  action. If these incen- 
tives are known to  be  weak, the  voters' 
decision rules endogeneously allow for  a 
small  number  of political  actions  to be deci- 
sive. In contrast  to voting studies, an analy- 
sis of political action does not have to ex- 
plain huge turnout. On the contrary,  the 
puzzle  that requires  explanation  is that small 
numbers can often  make a  "big splash" 
(Norman Nie  and Sidney Verba, 1975 p. 
27). 
II. The Model 
The society consists  of n people, indexed 
by  i = 1,...,n.  The  size  of  the  population, 
n, is odd and large but finite. An individual 
i has the loss function 
(1)  Li = (x-xi)2+  dic 
where x is the policy  outcome;  xi is individ- 
ual i's ideal point for policy outcomes;  c is 
the cost incurred  by individual  i when tak- 
ing political action, c>  0; di  is  an index 
variable  which takes on value 1 if individual 
i  takes political action, and value 0 other- 
2For strictly positive but not prohibitive  costs of 
voting,  individuals  may nevertheless  have incentives  to 
take costly  political  action  prior  to an election  in order 
to affect both electoral  turnout  and the votes of indi- 
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wise. For simplicity, the  ideal points are 
assumed  to  be  uniformly  distributed 
between -  X and X, X  > 0. The parameter 
x measures  the heterogeneity  of the popula- 
tion. The distribution  of ideal points is com- 
mon knowledge,  but each individual  is pri- 
vately informed  about her own ideal point. 
The policy outcome x  is determined by 
the policy  p and the state of the world s: 
(2)  x=  p-s. 
The state of the world s  is drawn from a 
commonly  known  uniform  distribution  f(s) 
which has strictly positive support on the 
unit interval.  The policy p  is chosen from 
the set {Q,  A}, where both the status quo Q 
and the  policy altemative A  are  exoge- 
neously  fixed and distinct  points on the unit 
interval, 0 < Q < A < 1. The median indi- 
vidual, whose ideal point is equal to 0, is 
indifferent  between the status quo and the 
policy alternative  for the state of the world 
s = (Q + A)/2.  A majority  is better off un- 
der the status quo for states of the world 
that satisfy s E [0,  (Q + A)/2),  and under 
the  policy  alternative for  others,  s E 
((Q + A)/2,  1]. 
People ultimately  care about policy out- 
comes. Since the policy and the state of the 
world  jointly  determine  the policy outcome, 
the  individuals' preferences over policies 
depend on  the  state of  the  world. New 
information  that is revealed  about the state 
of the world s has the potential  to allow  for 
the implementation  of a policy p  that off- 
sets the  effect of  s.  However, the policy 
preferred  by an individual  also depends on 
her preferences over policy outcomes, as 
summarized  by  her  ideal  point  xi.  Some 
individuals  with extreme preferences may 
not have incentives  to reveal their informa- 
tion truthfully.  Finally, the specification  of 
the cost term in the utility  function implies 
that information  revelation  through  political 
action comes at a cost privately  incurred  by 
activists. 
The time sequence of events is graphed 
in Figure 1. Nature draws the state of the 
world s. Then each individual  privately  ob- 
serves an independent realization of a bi- 
nary  signal cr.  The probability  that any indi- 
vidual  observes  the realization  o- = 1 is equal 
to s, while the probability  of the realization 
cr  = 0 is given by 1-  s. Thus, the realization 
of  cr is informative  about the state of the 
world.  Given  that the individual  experiences 
are made privately,  each individual  is very 
imperfectly  informed  about the state of the 
world s. In the aggregate,  the population  is 
better informed since it observes n  inde- 
pendent draws  of the signal a. However,  at 
this time, no single individual  is informed 
about the aggregate  number of individuals 
of type o-  = 1 or o-  = 0. 
At the political-action  stage of the game, 
the  individuals  are differentiated  with re- 
spect to their ideal points xi and their real- 
izations of the signal o-. Formally,  the indi- 
viduals' political-action  strategies are given 
by Ir(i, a).  An individual who takes political 
action (7r = 1) privately incurs the cost c; an 
individual  who abstains  Or  = 0) does not.3 
In this paper,  I focus on the case in which 
it is commonly  understood  that an individ- 
ual who takes political  action  wishes to indi- 
cate that she is of type a- = 1 (or, equiva- 
lently, that she is against the status quo). 
That is, individuals  can choose whether to 
send the costly message "I am type o-  = 1" 
or to  abstain from sending this message. 
The analysis  of the case in which the mes- 
sage implicit in a political action is "I am 
type a = 0" (or, equivalently,  "I am in favor 
of  the  status  quo")  is  symmetric. In 
Lohmann  (1993b), I modify the framework 
developed  here to examine  the case in which 
individuals  may  become active  on both sides 
of the issue; that is, they can send one or 
both of the messages  "I am type o-  = 1" and 
"I am type of = 0," or abstain. 
After m political actions are publicly  ob- 
served,  a referendum  takes place. Formally, 
the individuals'  voting strategies are given 
by  v-(i,  o,m).  Each  individual  either  votes 
3In  the equilibrium  characterized  in  Section III, 
mixed  strategies  of taking  political  action  or abstaining 
are dominated  due to the heterogeneity  of the popula- 
tion. Individuals  characterized  by a given information 
set at the political-action  stage have a strict  preference 
for taking  political  action  against  the status  quo if their 
ideal points lie strictly  above a cutoff point and for 
abstaining  if their ideal points lie strictly  below that 
point. Only the (knife-edge) individual  whose ideal 
point is exactly  equal to the cutoff  point is indifferent. 522  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE 1994 
Nature  draws  the  Each  individual  privately  Each  individual  forms 
state  of the  world  s.  observes  a realization  of  an update  on the 
the signal  a.  state  of the  world  s. 
Each  individual  chooses  Each  individual  observes  Each  individual  forms 
whether  to take  m political  actions.  an update  on the 
political  action  (r=1)  state  of the  world  s. 
or abstain  (xr=O). 
Each  individual  chooses  The  policy  altemative  The state  of the  world  s 
whether  to vote  for  the  is implemented  if it gets  is revealed.  The  individuals' 
status  quo  (v=O)  or  for  the  at  least  (n+1)12  votes;  payoffs  are  realized. 
policy  alternative  (v=l).  otherwise  the  status  quo 
is maintained. 
FIGURE  1.  TIME  SEQUENCE  OF EVENTS 
for the status quo (v = 0), or she casts her 
vote in favor of the policy alternative  (v = 
1).4  The  status quo is  overturned if  the 
number of votes for the policy alternative, 
N,  is greater than or equal to the simple 
majority  (n + 1)/2.  After the vote, the indi- 
vidual losses are realized as a function of 
the state of the world and the policy  chosen 
in the referendum. 
The  structure of  the  game is  common 
knowledge. The  equilibrium concept em- 
ployed is a refinement  of sequential  equilib- 
rium.  The concept of sequential  equilibrium 
(David Kreps and  Robert Wilson, 1982) 
restricts  the individuals  to use Bayes' Rule 
to update on the state of the world when 
they are privately  informed  about  their real- 
ization of the signal o- or publicly  informed 
about the aggregate  number  of political ac- 
tions, m. These updates take into account 
the individuals'  political-action  and voting 
strategies, their  beliefs  at  the  political- 
action and voting stages, and the common 
priors  on nature's  actions. 
By definition,  individuals  do not have in- 
centives to deviate from their equilibrium 
strategies. In  some cases, the  number of 
political actions that may be  observed if 
some  individual deviates is  realized with 
probability  zero in equilibrium.  The individ- 
ual  incentives to  deviate will depend on 
their  expectations about  the  voters' re- 
sponses to an out-of-equilibrium  number  of 
political  actions.  The  assumption  of 
Bayesian rationality  does not place restric- 
tions  on  voters' out-of-equilibrium  infer- 
ences. To close the model, I refine  the equi- 
librium concept by imposing the following 
restriction. Voters believe that the  mini- 
mum  number  of individuals  compatible  with 
4In the equilibrium  characterized  in  Section III, 
mixed voting strategies  are weakly dominated  due to 
the costlessness  of the vote and the heterogeneity  of 
the  electorate. Individuals  characterized  by a  given 
information  set at the voting  stage  have  weakly  undom- 
inated strategies  of voting for the policy alternative  if 
their ideal points lie strictly  above a cutoff point and 
for the status  quo if their ideal points lie strictly  below 
that point. VOL  . 84  NO. 3  LOHMANN: INFORMATIONAGGREGATION  523 
the  observed number of  political actions 
have deviated  from their equilibrium  strate- 
gies.' 
Moreover, I  restrict individuals to  use 
weakly  undominated  voting strategies.  That 
is, an individual  who is indifferent  between 
voting for the status quo or the alternative 
casts her vote  for the  policy she  prefers 
given her current information  set. This re- 
striction  eliminates  implausible  voting equi- 
libria of  the  following kind. Suppose all 
voters believe that one policy will win by 
more than one vote so that no individual 
can affect the voting outcome by changing 
her vote. Then each individual  is indifferent 
between voting for or against  any policy. In 
this case, some individuals  might vote  in 
favor  of a less preferred  policy.  As a conse- 
quence, one  policy may be  chosen even 
though  the alternative  policy  is preferred  by 
a majority. 
Due to the sequential  nature  of the game, 
individuals  are unable  to commit  to particu- 
lar voting strategies at the political-action 
stage  and  cannot change their political- 
action strategies once  they have reached 
the voting  stage.  Thus,  each individual's  best 
response  at the voting stage,  v(i, o-,  m), can 
be taken as given in the derivation  of her 
best response at the political-action  stage, 
7w(i,  o-); and 7r(i,  o-) can be taken as given in 
the derivation of  v(i, o-,  m). An equilibrium 
of the game is defined as follows. 
Definition:  An equilibrium  of the game is 
given  by  the  individuals' political-action 
strategies,  {7r(i,  o-)}; their beliefs at the po- 
litical-action stage,  {13(slJo)};  their voting 
strategies  {v(i, o-,  m)};  and  their  beliefs  at 
the voting stage, {13(s  Ii,  o-,  m)}.  Their strate- 
gies and beliefs are consistent  with one an- 
other and fulfill  the following  conditions: 
(i) Individual i's  political-action strategy 
7r(i,  o-) minimizes  her expected loss at 
the political-action  stage: 
(3)  E(Lijo) 
=  |Pr[N  <(n  +1)/2](Q  -s  -  xi) 
+Pr[N  2 (n + 1)/2] 
x (A  -  s - Xi)2}f3(  sI)  ds 
+Pr(dj  = 1)c 
where E(  ) is an expectations  operator. 
(ii) Individual  i uses Bayes' rule to update 
information  that 1(slo-) is the posterior 
density  of  the  state  of  the  world 
s  conditional on the private informa- 
tion  or. 
(iii) Individual  i's voting  rule v(i, o-, m) min- 
imizes her expected loss at the policy 
decision stage: 
(4)  E(Ljji,o(,,m) 
-  {Pr[N<(n+1)2](Q-s-  xi)2 
+Pr[N  2 (n + 1)/2] 
x (A  -  S -  xi)2}I3(sli,  o-, m) ds. 
(iv) Individual  i uses Bayes' rule to update 
information  that /(s Ii,  o-, m) is the pos- 
terior density of the state of the world 
s  conditional on her private informa- 
tion  (i,  o-)  and  the  public  in- 
formation m.  Moreover, her  out-of- 
equilibrium  inferences  are  formed 
5One motivation  for this refinement  is that individu- 
als might  make mistakes  (Reinhard  Selten, 1975);  that 
is, some individuals  might mistakenly  not follow their 
equilibrium  prescription  to take political  action or ab- 
stain. In principle,  the model could be modified to 
allow  for random  mistakes.  However,  I conjecture  that 
this extension  would add another  layer of uncertainty 
without  qualitatively  changing  the results.  For simplic- 
ity, I prefer  to refine  the equilibrium  concept  by impos- 
ing a plausible  restriction  on the individuals'  out-of- 
equilibrium  beliefs. 524  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE 1994 
POLITICAL-ACTION  STAGE: 
-x  x(a=1)  x(ca=O)  xi 
individuals 
mi individuals 
Strategies:  Fl,o  {A  7  Oif a-O  U 
VOTING STAGE: 
-x 
I  _l 
n(m) individuals 
n1(m)  individuals 
Strategies:  EV-  EVAOifa=o  v=1 
FIGURE  2.  POLITICAL  ACTIONANDVOTING1  if a =1I 
FIGURE  2.  POLITIcAL  ACTION AND VOTING PATTERNS 
according  to the rule 
(5)  13(sli,  cr,  m) 
-  P(sIi,o,mi)  if m>m 
\13(sli, o-,  m)  if m<m 
where mn  and m are the maximum  and 
minimum  numbers of political actions 
that can be  observed in  equilibrium 
with strictly  positive  probability. 
III. Political  Action  and Voting 
Equilibrium 
This  section  characterizes  a partially re- 
vealing  political  action  and voting  equilib- 
rium (see  Fig. 2).6 I first analyze the politi- 
cal-action stage, then the voting stage. 
6This equilibrium  coexists with a  zero political- 
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(8)  f  _  {Pr[N2(n+1)/21m]-Pr[N2(n+1)/21m-1]} 
x{[Q  -  s -(  =  0)]2 -[A  -  s -(  = O)]2} 
xb(m-m-l;n-m-r  ,s)(3(sloa=O)ds=c 
(9)  f  __E  {Pr[N 2 (n + 1)/21m] - Pr[N 2 (n + 1)/21m  -  1]} 
X {[Q  -  s -(  =  1)]2 -[A  -  s -(  =  1)]2} 
Xb(m-m-l;mn-m-l,s)(3(slo-=l)ds=c 
At the political-action  stage, people form 
beliefs about the state of the world based 
on their private  information: 
(6)  I3(slo)  2((1-s)  if aO= 
Individuals  of type a, = 0  tend to be more 
favorably  disposed toward the  status quo 
than are individuals of type oa  = 1: 
(7)  E(slor = O)  = 3 < E(slor =  1)  =  32. 
People make their political-action  deci- 
sions rationally  anticipating  the voters'  deci- 
sion rules that imply  a mapping  of the real- 
ized number of  political actions into the 
probability that  the  status quo  is  over- 
turned. Each individual  compares the cost 
of taking a political action to the expected 
private  benefits derived from a policy shift, 
multiplied  by the expected probability  that 
her action will be decisive in triggering  a 
policy shift. The equilibrium  is character- 
ized by two political-action cutoff points, 
x(a  = 0) and i(o  =  1).7 
An individual  of type a = 0 whose ideal 
point is exactly equal to  x(oa  = 0) is indif- 
ferent between taking  political action in fa- 
vor of the policy alternative  and abstaining. 
The cutoff point x(oa  = 0) is implicitly  de- 
fined by the indifference  condition  in equa- 
tion (8), above, where b(al;a2,a3)  is  the 
binomial  probability  that a2 Bernoulli  trials 
result in a1 successes if the probability  of a 
success is given by a3. Individuals  of type 
a = 0 whose ideal points lie strictly above 
the cutoff point x(oa  = 0) have a strict  pref- 
erence for taking political action. If their 
ideal points  lie strictly  below the cutoff  point 
x(a = 0), they strictly  prefer to abstain. 
An individual  of type oa  = 1 whose ideal 
point is exactly equal to  x(oa  = 1) is indif- 
ferent between taking  political action in fa- 
vor of the policy alternative  and abstaining. 
The cutoff point i(oa = 1) is implicitly  de- 
fined by the indifference  condition given in 
equation  (9), above. Individuals  of type a,  = 
1 whose ideal points lie strictly above the 
cutoff point x(oa  = 1) have a strict prefer- 
ence for taking  political  action.  If their ideal 
points lie  strictly below the  cutoff point 
x(a = 1), they strictly  prefer to abstain. 
Thus,  the  individuals' political-action 
strategies  can be summarized  by the follow- 
ing cutoff-point  rule:8 
{1  if xiE-[x (a  =  0),xT]  or if 
(10)  i(i,  G)  =  E [i(o=1),j(o=O)) 
and  = 1 
0  otherwise. 
In equilibrium  only individuals  in the sepa- 
rating  set  S = {iIxi e  [x(oa = 1), x(oa = O))} 
7The pure-strategy  cutoff-point  equilibrium  charac- 
terized here  does  not  necessarily exist. Lohmann 
(1993b) derives the conditions for nonexistence  and 
characterizes  the mixed-strategy  equilibrium  that may 
arise  in this situation. 
8I assume  that the (knife-edge)  indifferent  individ- 
ual takes political  action. The results are not qualita- 
tively  affected  by this assumption. 526  THE  AMERICAN  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  JUNE  1994 
engage  in informative  political  action.  These 
individuals  take action conditional  on being 
of  type o-  =1.  The  actions of  individuals 
whose ideal points lie above  the cutoff  point 
!(cr = 0) and the abstentions  of individuals 
whose ideal points lie below the cutoff  point 
i(o-  = 1) are uninformative. 
The number  of individuals  in the separat- 
ing set S is given  by mi  -  m, where hi and m 
are defined to be the natural numbers of 
individuals  whose ideal points lie  in  the 
intervals  [i(o-  = 1),  ] and [x(a  = 0), xI, re- 
spectively.  (These numbers  are determined 
by the fixed distribution  of the individuals' 
ideal points.) Upon observing m  political 
actions,  voters perfectly  infer that there are 
m -  m individuals of type ca  = 1 whose ideal 
points lie  in the separating  interval.9  The 
posterior  probability that  m -  m  out  of  mi 
-  m  individuals are of  type  o- = 1 is given 
by  the  binomial probability that  Fn  -  m 
Bernoulli  trials result in m -  m successes if 
the  probability of  a  success is  given by 
s, b(m -m;mn-  m, s). 
A  voter in  the  pooling set  P = {iIxi e 
[ -  x,  J]\[L(o-  =  1),  (o- =  O))}  has  some 
residual private information. (The "\"  is set 
notation  standing  for "without.")  If she is of 
type oa  =0,  she knows for sure that one 
individual  in the pooling interval  is of type 
a = 0. Her posterior  density  is given by 
(11)  ,8(sji EP,f  = O,  m) 
b(m -  m;m--  m,s)P8(slo  = 0) 
Jb(m -  m; mi  -  m, s)/3(sl  = O)  ds 
b(m-rm;mn-rm+1,s) 
fb(m  -  m;m-_-  + 1,s) ds 
A voter in the pooling set P who is of 
type uf = 1 knows  for sure that one individ- 
ual in the pooling interval  is of type o-  = 1. 
She forms the posterior  density 
(12)  I(sjieP,o=1,m) 
b(m -  m;m-i  -  m,s)P8(slo = 1) 
Jb(m  -  m;Fn -  m-  s)3(sor  =1)  ds 
b(m -m+1;m--m+1,s) 
Jb(m-rm+1;m-m+1,s)ds 
A voter in the separating  set S does not 
have any residual private information.  Her 
posterior  density  on the state of the world  is 
given by 
(13)  1(sliE  S,o,m) 
b(m-_m; Fi  m--  _1,  s)/3(sla  =  ) 
Jb(m -  M;  m  -  r  -_1,  s),3(sla  =  0) ds 
if o =  0 
b(m -  m -1;  i -  m -  1, s)(3(slr  =  1) 
fb(m  -  mr-1  fi -  mr-1,  s)3(slo  =  1) ds 
if Or  1 
b(m-_m;m-  m,s) 
Jfb m -  m; mn  -  m,  s) ds 
For a given realization  of m, a voter of 
type (i,ao)  whose ideal point is  given by 
x(i,ar,m)  is indifferent  between the status 
quo and the policy alternative: 
(14)  f[Q-s-I(i,o,  m)]2p(sli,a,m)ds 
=f[A  -  S -X  (i,  m)]2  (s  Ii,,m)ds. 
All  individuals  of  type (i,o-)  whose ideal 
points are strictly greater than their type- 
specific cutoff point x(i, o-,  m) have a strict 
preference for the policy alternative over 
the status quo; all those whose ideal points 
lie below that point strictly  prefer the status 
9The analysis  is easily extended  to allow  for incom- 
plete information  about  the distribution  of the individ- 
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quo. Equations  (11)-(14) imply  that 
(15)  1(ieP,o=1,m)<1(ieS,or,m) 
<1(i  EP, c =O, m) 
(16)  i(ieP,o=1,m) 
=ix(ieP,-=O,m+1) 
(17)  di(i,o,,m)/dm<O. 
Let ,hQ  be the critical  number  of political 
actions such that the  natural number of 
individuals whose  ideal points lie  in  the 
interval  [-  x, x(i  E  P, a  = 1, m =  rnQ))  is 
given by (n + 1)/2 + 1. Similarly,  mA is de- 
fined to be the critical number of political 
actions such that the  natural number of 
individuals  whose  ideal points lie  in  the 
interval [x(i  E P, oa  = 0, m = mA),  x]  is given 
by (n + 1)/2 + 1. Then if the realized num- 
ber of political actions m is weakly smaller 
than rnQ, a majority  of individuals  will vote 
for the status  quo; if the realized  number  of 
political actions m  is weakly greater than 
mA, a majority  of individuals  will cast their 
votes in favor of the policy alternative.10  In 
each case, no individual  is decisive for the 
voting outcome, and thus each individual 
votes for the candidate she prefers given 
her current  information  set. 
For m E (?IQQ,  mA), each individual's  vote 
may  be decisive  for the voting  outcome, and 
each individual  has incentives to condition 
her vote on the information  revealed  by her 
being decisive (David Austen-Smith, 1990; 
Timothy  J.  Feddersen  and  Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer,  1993).  That  is, each individual's 
voting decision is based on  her Bayesian 
update on the state of the world s  that is 
conditioned  on exactly  (n -  1)/2  other indi- 
viduals voting for  the  policy alternative. 
Conditional  on being decisive,  an individual 
of type (i, a)  whose ideal point is given by 
x(i,  m)  is indifferent  between voting for 
the status quo and the policy alternative. 
This cutoff point implicitly  solves the indif- 
ference condition 
(18)  f[Q-S-?(i  (rm)]26(sIi,o,m)ds 
=  _[ 
A 
(i,  a,  M)]23(Sli, a,  m)d 
where 8(sli, o-,  m)  are the individual's  pos- 
terior beliefs on the state of the world s 
conditional  on being decisive for the voting 
outcome, 
(19)  8(sli,a,m) 
b[(n -1)/2-  n;fi- n--1,s]j8(sli,a,m) 
Jb[(n-1)/2-  n;ii-  n-_1,s]P8(sli,a,m)ds 
and n  and n  are the minimum  and maxi- 
mum numbers  of votes that are cast for the 
policy alternative in  equilibrium, respec- 
tively,  given  the realized  number  of political 
actions,  m.  All  individuals whose  ideal 
points lie  above their type-specific  voting 
cutoff points x(i,a,m)  vote for the policy 
alternative; all  others cast their votes  in 
favor  of the status quo. 
Thus, the individuals'  voting  behavior  can 
be summarized  by the following  cutoff-point 
rule: 
(20)  v(i, o,m) 
1  if xiE  [x*(icEP,o=O,m),X];orif 
xi E [x*(i E S,or,m), x*(i E P,or = 0,m)) 
=  and ieS;  orif 
xi E [x*(i E P,or  = 1,m), x*(i E P,or  = 0,m)), 
isPand  or=1 
O  otherwise 
10I  assume that the (knife-edge)  individual  who is 
indifferent  between voting for the status quo and the 
policy alternative  casts her vote in favor  of the latter. 
The results are not qualitatively  affected by this as- 
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where 
(21)  x*(i,a,m) 
fx(i,u,m)  if mE [O,hlQ]orme[FnA,n] 
\kx(i,  o,  m)  if m E (thQ, mA)- 
It follows that the minimum  and maximum 
numbers  of votes for the policy alternative 
in equilibrium  are given by n(m) and ni(m), 
respectively, where  n(m)  is  the  natural 
number  of individuals  whose ideal points lie 
in the set 
{xilx, e  [x*(i  e P,  = O,m),x] 
u {[(O-  =  1),  i(O  = O)) 
n [x*(i  S,er,m), 
x*(iEP,o  =,m))}} 
and n(m) is the natural  number  of individ- 
uals whose ideal points lie in the set 
{XilXi  E  [x*(i  E P,o  =  J,m),X] 
U {[xf(0  =  1),  X (0  =  O)) 
n [x* (ie  S,a,m), 
x* (iEP,o=O,m))}}. 
(These numbers  are determined  by the fixed 
distribution  of the individuals'  ideal points.) 
Given the individuals'  cutoff-point  voting 
rules,  the probability  that the status  quo will 
be overturned  as a function of the realized 
number  of political actions m can be sum- 
marized  by 
(22)  Pr[N2(n+1)/21m] 
O  if me[O,th] 
b(N -  n; n -  n, s) 
N=(n+1)/2 
if me(=  hQ,izA) 
if me=[IrA,n]n 
In summary,  the individuals'  incentives  to 
take political action affect the voters' deci- 
sion rules that imply a mapping  of the ob- 
served number  of political actions into the 
probability that  the  status quo  is  over- 
turned.  This functional  relationship,  in turn, 
determines the  individuals' incentives to 
take political  action. 
For some strictly positive but not pro- 
hibitive costs, some individuals may have 
incentives  to engage in informative  political 
action despite the free-rider problem that 
arises in the presence of  a cost of taking 
action.  However,  some  information  is 
trapped due  to  the  heterogeneity of  the 
population and the cost of  taking action. 
The private  information  held by individuals 
with extreme preferences is  not  revealed 
due to the distributional  effects of informa- 
tion  revelation.  Extremist  activists  are 
trapped  into taking  costly  but uninformative 
action in their futile attempt  to manipulate 
voters'  decisions.  They know  that voters dis- 
count the  political-action turnout for  ex- 
tremist political action. Given the voters' 
updating rules, they are "forced" to  take 
political action to prevent an unacceptable 
reduction  in the probability  that a majority 
will vote in favor of the policy alternative. 
Moreover,  some individuals  abstain  because 
they are close to  indifferent between the 
status  quo and the policy alternative  and do 
not find it worthwhile  to incur the cost of 
taking action. They free-ride on the efforts 
of the activists  who take informative  politi- 
cal action. Other individuals  with extreme 
preferences for the status quo abstain be- 
cause they do not want to increase  the like- 
lihood that the status quo is overturned.'1 
'tLohmann  (1993b)  modifies  the framework  devel- 
oped here, allowing individuals  to become active in 
favor  of the status quo or the policy alternative,  or to 
abstain.  The following  pattern  of participation  emerges. 
Extremists  on both sides of the issue turn  out indepen- 
dently of their private information.  Some moderates 
who favor  the status  quo become active  in favor  of the 
status quo conditional  on  their private information. 
Similarly,  some moderates  who are against  the status 
quo take informative  political action in favor of the 
policy alternative.  Other moderates  who are close to 
indifferent  between  the status  quo and the policy  alter- 
native abstain  independently  of their private  informa- 
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Voters only observe a simple aggregate 
statistic, the  realized number of  political 
actions. They do not observe the identity 
(preferences and information set)  of  any 
particular individual who  takes action or 
abstains. As  a  consequence, they cannot 
distinguish  whether an activist  is taking in- 
formative or manipulative  political action. 
Similarly,  they do not know the motives of 
any  particular individual who  abstains. 
However,  since some individuals  take politi- 
cal action  conditional  on their private  infor- 
mation,  voters can extract  some information 
from the aggregate  number  of political ac- 
tions. In  solving their Bayesian inference 
problem,  they take into account that some 
individuals  take uninformative  political ac- 
tion, while others abstain  regardless  of their 
private  information.  In particular,  the analy- 
sis implies that the voters' decision rules 
endogeneously  allow for a small number  of 
political  actions  to be decisive  if the individ- 
uals' incentives to take political action are 
known  to be weak. 
IV. Pre-Election  Political  Action  and 
Mistaken  Voting  Outcomes 
The  full-information  voting outcome is 
defined  as  the  outcome  that  would  be 
achieved  if all the information  dispersed  in 
the population were revealed prior to the 
vote. By informing  voting  decisions,  political 
action has  the  potential to  increase the 
ex ante  likelihood that the full-information 
outcome is achieved. Taking as given that 
the population  is engaged in an equilibrium 
with strictly  positive  expected  turnout  at the 
political-action  stage, the ex ante likelihood 
of  a  mistaken voting outcome is  smaller, 
the larger is the size of the separating  in- 
terval  S. 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  however,  the 
marginal  contribution  of the political-action 
mechanism  may consist in adding noise. In 
some cases, the full-information  voting out- 
come is  ex ante  more likely to be imple- 
mented by the  voting mechanism in  the 
absence  of pre-election  political  action.  The 
following  example  illustrates  this possibility. 
Consider the case in which the popula- 
tion is relatively  homogeneous (x  is small 
relative to the normalized  variance of the 
states of  the world, one-twelfth), and the 
policies Q and A are located approximately 
symmetrically  around  one-half such that 
(23) 
fsb[(n  + 1)/2;  n, s] ds 
2 ( Q + A)/2 
fb[(n  + 1)/2;n,s]  ds 
(24) 
fsb[(n  -1)/2;n,s]  ds 
< ( Q + A)/2 
fb[(n  -1)/2;  n, s] ds 
If individuals  were fully informed  about the 
number of  individuals  of  type a, =0  and 
a  =  1, the policy  alternative  would  be unani- 
mously chosen if the number  of individuals 
of  type oa  = 1 is greater than or equal to 
(n + 1)/2;  otherwise all individuals  would 
vote for the status quo. If each individual  is 
privately informed about her type oa, the 
voting  mechanism implements the  full- 
information  outcome with probability  1 in 
the  absence  of  pre-election political  action. 
All individuals of type a  = 0 vote in favor of 
the status quo, while all individuals  of type 
a = 1 vote in favor  of the policy alternative. 
Thus, the status quo is overturned  if and 
only if  (n + 1)/2  individuals are  of  type 
a = 1. 
In this situation,  pre-election  political  ac- 
tion would be  counterproductive.  Due  to 
the cost of taking action, some individuals 
would abstain. By chance, the fraction of 
individuals  of type oa  = 1 whose ideal points 
lie in the separating  interval  S may not be 
representative  of that fraction  in the popu- 
lation at large.  Thus, the ex ante probability 
that the full-information  voting  outcome  will 
be achieved  would be less than 1. The zero 
political-action equilibrium,  which is  also 
associated  with a zero aggregate  deadweight 
cost of taking  action, dominates  in terms of 
the  ex ante expected aggregate loss. This 
example suggests that  the  informational 530  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE 1994 
contribution  of  the  political-action  mecha- 
nism  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  the 
dispersed  information is  aggregated by the 
voting mechanism.12 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the situation in 
which  information  pertinent  to  individual 
voting decisions  is dispersed in the popula- 
tion.  Some  individuals with moderate  pref- 
erences  engage  in costly political  action to 
signal  their  private  information  to  voters. 
Other individuals, who  have more  extreme 
preferences,  take  action  independently  of 
their private information in a futile attempt 
to  manipulate  the voters' decisions.  Voters 
take  a  cue  from  the  size  of  the  protest 
movement  against the status quo, rationally 
discounting  the  observed  turnout  for  ex- 
tremist political action. 
By  informing  voting  decisions,  political 
action  has  the  potential  to  decrease  the 
ex ante likelihood of a mistaken voting out- 
come.  However, political  action is counter- 
productive if the voting mechanism is more 
likely to implement the full-information vot- 
ing outcome  in the  absence  of pre-election 
communication.  In  this  situation,  political 
action only adds noise. 
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